Trigger: Categories - Ego States or Alters

tylas wrote:I feel like my Alters all have ego states!
...
Anyone else feel like this?

Yes, we've felt like this and can give examples. Jonathan has distinct states. The main one is when he goes about things being himself, thinking Jonathan thoughts, talking to people the way he talks. A second one is when he takes over subtly and avoids all thought that he is anyone different, his choices are more John-like in this state, which seems to have been designed to fool me when I wasn't losing time. He and I both can get confused about who is out when he's in this state, yet we've tested and it's all him. A third is a weird super-clean-up mode he goes into that I can best describe as if Samantha (Bewitched) twitched her nose to make the body speed up several times normal speed in order to clean up a big mess, a paperwork backlog, or the whole house. The second and third state feel largely not under his own control.

Some people have said they feel like their alters have alters. Or an alter has DID. It seems to me that each of these statements do say something unique about what's happening with their system.

Johnny-Jack wrote:... plus the other forums just aren't as active.

DID'rs must just be an entertaining lot.

-- Sun Mar 18, 2012 8:31 pm --

Johnny-Jack wrote:

tylas wrote:I feel like my Alters all have ego states!
...
Anyone else feel like this?

Yes, we've felt like this and can give examples.

That's impressive. I would be at such a loss if I had to try and figure out what other parts think, feel and such. I am so numb and unaware that it's hard for me to do that. I have to ask everything.

All but fragments (fragment count according to ISH is a 33 right now) and my 4 ISH's report that they have ego states. Many however just copy or ask others if they have or do something since they are not sure, but enough are sure that they do.

Demon Lilith wrote:I ws actually going to suggest that article! If you get time, it's great to read. It helps support DID not being caused by sociocognitive reasons, as well.
~Rage

I finally read it! It's a brilliant article!

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_url?h ... i=scholarr

tylas wrote:
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_url?h ... i=scholarr

After I read it, I passed it on to a friend. He wrote a summary of it - which is still a work in progress, that others can contribute to as well. It's like a Wicki page.

https://sites.google.com/site/phoenixal ... tive?pli=1

I answered this in another thread
dissociative-identity/topic85186-20.html#p765177
but it's more appropriate here:
Categories: PTSD, DDNOS, DID

This might un-muddle it for some of you and muddle it for others, but in the words of my LC:

"Some discussions are focused on merely, or fundamentally, conceptual distinctions. E.g., "If we understand PTSD and DID both to have dissociation, but DID alone has amnesic boundaries, then they cannot be the same disorder." One sees this sort of focus in theory discussions - e.g., Howell's (2011) discussion of Personality Disorders, and especially Borderline P. D. as dissociative disorders. Some of these discussion may be seen to be focused on making distinctions, and other on enlarging already existing categories (again - see Howell's discussion for an example).

Some (e.g., Dell, 2006), are working to develop a better (more full and accurate) description of the traits which actually distinguish one or more diagnoses in the real world. These efforts produce rich, but not necessarily useful, trait assemblies. (He says as much, when he says that his description of DID is not addressing the problem of diagnosis, which he states is a separate issue.)

Some are focused on trait distinctions which enable one to sort an individual into two or more categories in the real world, usually for diagnostic or research purposes. The emphasis must therefore be on empirically verifiable, verified, and useful traits. E.g., "Given that some individuals, after an emotionally disturbing event, experience disturbances that last longer than do other, let us stipulate (and that's all it is - an artificial categorization of a real-world continuum) that If an individual has the following traits, they have posttraumatic stress. If it resolves within 30 days, they have Acute Stress Disorder (ASD); if not, they have Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)." Note that when disorders are described for this purpose, the descriptions are focused on traits that allow the distinction, and NOT on a complete accounting of all traits characterizing a category which one might expect to find. The trait assemblies are therefore intended to be useful and accurate, but not necessarily at all complete.

Finally, some discussions are action focused: their concern is treatment. One can find (although I have no references on this at my fingertips) which state that since ASD and PTSD have the same functional traits, they should be treatable using identical approaches. Furthermore, since they are indeed so treatable, they are the same disorder - the distinction is not therefore of any real use.

Now, the point of all this: If, in any discussion of the various sorts of animals in the zoo, one is not clear about the purposes of one's sources, and one's OWN purposes, the result will be VERY confusing. A muddle. There is no escape from this problem.

Dell (2006) escapes the problem by making it clear from the outset that he seeks a better descriptive trait assembly than that provided by the DSM-IV, which is that which is depended upon by the vast majority of the professional world. The problem is that people take the DSM traits to be an adequate description of DID, and it isn't at all. He then proposes, and empirically validates a supposedly superior trait assembly. A beautiful piece of work, I think. Finally, he makes it clear that the diagnostic usefulness of each of the traits in the assembly has not at all been addressed by his research - that that is an entirely separate question, as indeed it is. There is a formal process for addressing that question, and at this time in the history of the DSM-V, all diagnosis descriptions in the proposed new DSM are undergoing, or have undergone, that process. His careful description of what he IS and IS NOT doing helps us to see exactly what his contribution is, and thus to better hold it in our minds. Very well done, say I.

So, where does that leave us? With a large, rather than small, task, which we need to define better.

I suspect YOU are after conceptual distinctions. You are not a trained empiricist, and don't (yet) adequately grasp the problems that must be addressed in any serious empirical research. The traditional way to establish conceptual distinctions is through a careful compare and contrast discussion. But what is your material? You must, in order to be clear (a) stipulate the authorities you are following, (b) what they are saying, and then (c) how they compare and contrast. I don't think you have yet met this standard.

I, on the other hand, am very interested in empirical reality. I KNOW what I want:

1. I want to have knowledge of the actual structure of reality. This will require rich trait descriptions, operationally defined, which lead to rich data sets, which then undergo latent structure analysis to pull out the actual structure of the domain being addressed. How important is this? Very. For example, such analyses of the traits descriptive of PTSD have fairly recently shown that four, not three, symptom clusters are found in the disorder - the additional one having to do with (ta da) dissociation. Has this latest research been adequately validated, with additional research. Probably not. Will it be reflected in the DSM-5? No, not as of my latest study of the matter (and I'm overdue to look at the latest draft - it's due out on the website "Spring 2012", and may already be there). Does any of this matter relative to questions of treatment? I don't know, but I suspect so, which is why I cannot simply drop it and go play golf (if I even liked golf!).

2. I want trait descriptions which allow good sorting of individuals into useful treatment categories. The big problem here is that category development is a long process, which unfolds in spasms of development (the DSM is revised about every 25 years), while treatment development is ongoing and always developing. Matching up the diagnostic distinctions with the useful treatment modalities is a never-ending process target. In truth, the latest developments on THIS question are never found in the DSM - or at least not for long. One must stay up with the professional literature to get them - or at least query PubMed rather regularly.

For now, I'll settle for a decent take on #1. That requires a careful, very well structured, review of the literature - for all the trauma-related (recognized and proposed) and all the dissociation-related (recognized and proposed) disorders. I see this as an ongoing project, to say the least, and I want a very thoughtfully structured "container" for the results of the lit. review to be set up in advance. THAT's why I've been working on this knowledge database idea, simply as a way to hold and retrieve summary assertions and their characteristics which are supported by a careful reading of the empirical and theoretical literature.

Once I have a process for that set up, I propose to set up several tables to summarize it all.

Finally, I think a verbal synopsis, which directs one attention to the most crucial aspects of the whole matter, would be useful.

So, there's a map of where I'm going this next year - and it's all your fault! (heh heh)"

-- Tue Apr 03, 2012 1:50 pm --

More on Time loss and the differences between DDNOS-1 and DID.
dissociative-identity/topic83956.html

This topic is of great interest to me. I feel I lie somewhere between DDNOS and DID. Perhaps I could then qualify for the distinction of DDNOS-1 but I'm not really sure. I'm not sure the exact differences I suppose. I used to feel that figuring out what I "was" and which diagnosis fit me was of the utmost importance. As I go along, I'm finding more and more that the diagnosis (whether I'm "DID", "DDNOS-1", or "DDNOS") is really secondary to my own symptoms and my own experience. It's my experience that defines me and makes me who I am, not any diagnosis. And as boopsey has aptly described earlier, these are labels put on things that are much more complex. Still, I do see the benefit of these categories and distinctions.

My own experience is that I feel I have fairly distinct parts, as well as less distinct parts, without any time loss. One of my main parts does very clearly have her own ego states. The rest of my parts I'm not so sure about. They may be closer to simply being ego states themselves, but it could also be that I simply don't know them well enough to see them as being more complex. Most of my parts do not come out voluntarily or at will but are rather triggered out. With the exception of two that I can think of, and these two usually come out at particular times of day (although they are not limited to coming at these times of day).

Anyway.. That's just my 2c worth. I asked my therapist a couple sessions ago whether she thought I was DID, and she basically never really answered my question. Which is fine with me. I've gotten very hung up on the diagnosis in the past, and prefer to not have that be the primary focus in therapy anyways.

Thanks again for this thread. Very interesting.

I would also like to agree with boopsy26:

"All the terms of "ego states" "ANP's" "hosts", etc. are all conceptualized theories that are not actually tangible things. As much as alters may feel like real people, they are, in actually, still part of one person........"[/quote]

I would not describe myself as an intangible "thing' It is clear we share a body that cannot be denied but does that makes me less real?
I breath,study at uni, go to the gym,eat and have my own friends and a partner as do a lot of the others I share this body with
who is more real then them or me?
what if the theory that there has to be one "core" person or "part" could be debated and not everyone with DDNOS or D.I.D is structured in the same way
we love,live, feel pain ,communicate on forums and come up with our own values,ethos and theories
I think you should be careful how you phrase your wording for who is more real the person or "part who loses time,has fragmented memory or the "alters" who "may feel real" who have experienced pain,genuine emotion an affect ,hold memories ,experience and have kept the body alive.
I think everyone has the right to be treated as a person if thats how they experience themselves to be
and validated in this.

I'm assuming, lifeontheinside, that you were meaning that you disagree with me.

That's fine, you don't have to agree. However, I do not apologize for my comment. I was relaying the fact that terms and descriptive categories are not tangible objects. I was not referring to the actual subjective experience of one's various parts and alters. However, I also would say that regardless of how they are experienced, they're still part of one body and one mind. This is what I was referring to. There is not a "ego state" object in the brain that is distinctly separate from an "alter" object in the brain. These are abstract ideas used to describe very complex experiences. For some these terms help, but for others they are confusing and make them feel ostracized because they don't feel it relates to them. My point to Tylas is to stop saying that these things definitively exist as fact. When she keeps saying this, though her intentions are good, it comes across as hard to swallow by many (including myself). Because these are not factual objects one can put their hands around and outline in some figure form. They are ideas and theories. Again, this has nothing to do with the [i]experience[i] of different states which are all very real and very tangible to the person experiencing them. I think that my reference to an abstract is being interpreted by you in the concrete and that just doesn't work. You can't compare the 2.

lifeontheinside wrote:I would not describe myself as an intangible "thing' It is clear we share a body that cannot be denied but does that makes me less real?

Less real than who - less real than what part ? You are assuming that any part is tangible. They are not. All parts are equally important. I don't know of a theory that there is one core. There is a part of consciousness the other parts protect from trauma memory.

Who am I? Many deep thinkers struggle with this that do not have any sort of mental disorder -
I struggled with this for a long time because what you refer to as a core in me was unaware all my life until a couple of months ago - but this part does not have a visible body, it is not a tangible thing either - it is simply a part of consciousness that the others protected from trauma memories.

-- Fri Apr 06, 2012 10:24 am --

boopsy26 wrote: There is not a "ego state" object in the brain that is distinctly separate from an "alter" object in the brain. These are abstract ideas used to describe very complex experiences.

Yeah, Boopsy has "got it"

boopsy26 wrote:My point to Tylas is to stop saying that these things definitively exist as fact. When she keeps saying this, though her intentions are good, it comes across as hard to swallow by many (including myself). Because these are not factual objects one can put their hands around and outline in some figure form.

It's the biologist in me. All this abstract mental stuff is hard to grasp when you want to see it and categorize it.

boopsy26 wrote: They are ideas and theories. Again, this has nothing to do with the [i]experience[i] of different states which are all very real and very tangible to the person experiencing them.

But! They are very important ideas and theories that have a lot of research and brilliant thinking behind them! To go to the other extreme and ignore all that and just go on what you feel is happening in your own head is also a mistake. That is the stuff that I find hard to swallow.

tylas wrote:They are very important ideas and theories that have a lot of research and brilliant thinking behind them! To go to the other extreme and ignore all that and just go on what you feel is happening in your own head is also a mistake. That is the stuff that I find hard to swallow.

I agree with this completely

But! The idea you keep putting forth regarding ego states and ANP's, etc., belongs to 1 group of researchers (Van der Hart et al.). I, personally, do not relate to this conceptualization, and many others do not either. I also feel that this theory, in particular, makes some sort of distinction between DDNOS and DID that is not so clear cut.

I do not go to an extreme and go on what I feel... there are may other theorists putting forth their ideas as well: There's Howell's idea that we all have different self states and DID is just more dissociated; there's the neurological explanation that "alters" are simply neural networks formulated around unprocessed implicit memories that are not connected to other neural networks and are located in various specialized areas of the brain; there is Ross's idea that DID is a dissociative form of schizophrenia; there's Kluft's idea that DID operates in a third reality dictated by trance logic and that alter's are a pseudodelusion; there's Schwartz's family systems model that posits that all parts operate in a feedback loop and exist to perform functions; and there are many more.

Whatever theory speaks to an individual to help them explain their experience is "right". Not one of these conceptualizations is more factual than another... because none of this is tangible