Broadwind wrote: I do have a few theories on this, and the main one being i think free will is an illusion. I think that people are entirely a result of their environment and their "initial conditions" (i.e genetics). There is no "me" directing the show making the choices. If time was reversed and replayed you would see the same person do the same thing again and would swear they had a free-will choice about it. I guess some of my thoughts about this come from having a disorder of free-will.
My preliminary response was
Just to put any misunderstandings out of the way this thread is free for all and not intended as an exclusive discussion between Broadwind and I.HungryJoe wrote:I consider this very "iffy", but rather than discuss it here I'll make a new thread about it as it's a large topic. I hope you'll participate
When it comes to free will I have an opportunistic Pascals wager (link) approach to it. Naturally this implies that I think that the Pascals wager type of thinking is valid here even though the argument is bunk in its original application. It goes like this:
Premises:
1. Either I have free will or I don't
2. Either I think I have free will or I think I don't have free will.
3. All permutations of 1 and 2 are equally possible (for the sake of simplicity)
If I have free will and think I have free will I will make the necessary choices. Arguably this is a good thing. (Good)
If I don't have free will, but are under the illusion that I have it then this illusion will not influence my actions negatively because I lack free will anyway. (neutral)
If I do have free will, but I think I don't have it then I may be passive in response to events where I did in fact have a choice. The consequences of this are likely to be detrimental to me. (Bad)
If I don't have free will and I don't think I have free will things will move along as predetermined. (neutral)
Thinking I have free will is either good or neutral.
Thinking I don't have free will is either neutral or bad.
Therefore I choose to think I have free will.
Free will is a hot topic in philosophy, religion and science, particularly neuroscience. One way around the whole mess is to look at the self differently. Traditionally self has been defined as the conscious and choosing agent within the brain (some will say mind here) while the religious will go further and say it's the soul/spirit which presumably isn't part of the brain at all. I prefer to turn this on its head and say "the self" is that which chooses (stolen from a philosopher named Dennett), be it conscious or unconscious and be it brain, mind or soul. This may be seen as an argument from redefinition, but the essence is that I accept full responsibility for that which is me, regardless of prior causes because I cannot separate those prior causes from that which is me. I almost always choose strawberry flavoured icecream, but tomorrow I can choose chocolate if I want to. There is no force that makes me always choose strawberry, but doubtless there is a reason in the past why I prefer it. In the absence of such a force I have a free will to act with or against my instincts.